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Veterans in Australia: the Search for Integration 
Jane Ross
Australia and the war
Vietnam  was not what its veterans wanted it to have been. It was 
unsuccessful— more so than most o f them seem to admit— and it was 
unpopular— though not so unpopular in Australia as most o f them now 
believe after view ing the war through Am erican mass media.
The Vietnam war continued the theme of dependency in Australia’s 
foreign policy,1 but with a different cultural outcome. A fter the First 
World War, which impacted so hugely on Australians at a personal level2 
(because o f the number o f men who fought in Europe and the Middle 
East), the m ilitary experiences were used to form the basis of an 
independent, national identity myth, known variously as the myth or 
tradition o f Anzac or the myth o f the diggers.3 The Second W orld W ar saw 
the country’s dependence shift from  Britain to the United States, but still 
the national identity remained robustly intact.
A fter Vietnam, however, different cultural processes were at 
work. Because Vietnam  was not comparable to our earlier wars it did not 
fit im mediately into the military tradition; more importantly, the 
enormous impact on our culture o f Am erican media and the rapid 
adaptation o f Am erican ideas by our veterans meant that Australian 
representations o f the war were largely based on American memories 
and interpretations.4 W e can see this most clearly in the two issues 
which have played a central role in defining “the” Australian veteran: 
Agent Orange, and the problem of homecoming and the need for a 
welcome home march.
The 50.000 or so veterans deal with their memories o f the war in 
many different ways.5 For some, the full-time veterans, it is the defining 
element o f their identity. Some are damaged beyond cure either 
physically or mentally, while others lead productive lives untroubled by 
their experiences. For some, the war is with them constantly, while 
others left it behind when they boarded the plane or ship for their return 
to Australia.
It is difficult to say to what extent “the veterans” do indeed form 
any sort o f coherent group; and it is also difficult even as late as the end 
o f 1990 to see whether the experiences of Vietnam have stabilised into 
coherent cultural forms. It does seem, however, that both the Vietnam 
veterans as a whole and their memories are being absorbed progressively 
into the mainstream  community o f returned servicemen and into its 
official ideology, the Anzac tradition. In this sense, the war is at last being 
Australianised.
VeUrcuu in  A ustra lia : The Search fo r  Integration 51
The Vietnam war has proven difficult to integrate because the 
war impinged very little on so many Australians, and never made very 
much sense. It is hard to remember why we, as a nation, did so casually, 
thoughtlessly and irresponsibly condemn so many young men to the 
possibility of death or irretrievable damage. There was opposition to the 
war in Australia, but the experience of serving in the Australian forces 
was not a radicalising one. There was never any organised opposition 
within the army, and the soldiers prided themselves on their 
professionalism which meant that they consciously did not concern 
themselves with the politics or morality of their country’s commitment 
to the American cause. There were no organised “veterans against the 
war” either, and even the Vietnam Veterans’ Association of Australia 
(W A A ), which is oppositional on many matters, is rousingly conservative 
when it comes to the big questions about the war.® The soldiers were, in 
fact, veiy much representatives of mainstream Australia.
The opposition to the war—and it did grow over the course of the 
war—had two strands. The more radical branch was opposed to the war 
itself, or to Australia’s part in it. The other branch had deep historical 
antecedents; Australia was acutely divided during the First World War 
over the question of conscription (which was finally rejected, leaving the 
Australians in that war the only wholly volunteer force), and this aspect 
of the commitment to Vietnam was the one which raised the most doubts 
in the general community.
However, despite opposition from some sections of the community, 
many were in favour of compulsory m ililaiy service and many of those 
conscripted were not particularly opposed to doing their two years. Once 
they were in, and had been trained, then a tour of Vietnam seemed the 
obvious next step. The army claimed at various times that only those 
conscripts who volunteered for service in Vietnam were actually posted 
there, and it does seem as though there would have been no shortage of 
those willing to go.
The Agent Orange issue in Australia 7
The stoiy of Agent Orange will be familiar to readers in the United 
States who have followed the course of the dispute in their country. 
Indeed, without the actions of American veterans it seems doubtful 
whether it would ever have become an issue in Australia, and the 
Australian case has been very derivative of the American one. Until it 
became an issue in the United States, no Australian claims for chemical 
damage had been filed: even since then, there have been only a handful.
The chemical issue only came to the fore in Australia in the late 
1970s. The Australian Government at first stupidly denied that any 
Australian soldiers had ever been exposed. The claim was speedily 
retracted, being patently false, but the Government then insisted that 
established veterans’ channels could handle the problem, if indeed there 
was one. But the W A A  refused to accept this, continued to lobby, and 
instead of using the established channels such as the lobbying power of
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the Returned Services League (RSL), relied on media pressure and its 
own direct contacts with politicians and bureaucrats.
The W A A ’s efforts met with mixed success. When it demanded 
a judicial rather than scientific enquiry the Government referred the 
matter to the Senate Standing Committee on Science and the Environment 
which produced Pesticides and the Health o f Australian Vietnam Veterans, 
1982, and promised a comprehensive study into the health of veterans 
and their offspring. This study— the so-called morbidity survey— 
unfortunately never eventuated. The other studies which were completed 
were not accepted as valid by the W A A  (presumably because they all 
used sample survey techniques rather than investigating the entire 
population of veterans) and it continued to push for a Royal Commission, 
the only body felt to have sufficiently wide powers of enquiry and criteria 
of assessment, and which would remain independent of government 
opinion and/or policy.
The Royal Commission was established under Justice Philip 
Evatt in 1983; the report in nine volumes was finally presented in July 
1985, after hearing evidence from many veterans and experts. The 
release o f the report did little, at least immediately, to defuse the issue. 
The Commission functioned, in effect, as a trial of Agent Orange. The 
counsel Tor" the chemicals was briefed by various chemical companies 
such as Monsanto; the case “against", and therefore “lor" the veterans, 
was argued by the W A A . The case against Agent Orange was found to 
be not proven; that is, the chemicals were presumed innocent unless 
proven guilty, and the Royal Commissioner announced his verdict in 
extravagant language:
So Agent Orange is Not Guilty and the chemical agents used to 
defoliate battle zones in Vietnam and to protect Australians from 
malaria are not to blame.
No one lost.
This is not a matter for regret but for rejoicing. Veterans and their 
wives are no more at risk of having abnormal offspring than 
anyone else. Veterans have not been poisoned. The number with 
general health problems is small, probably much smaller than 
amongst their peers in the community. The few that have 
psychological stress disorders can seek help freely and without 
shame and above all with hope of early relief and in the sure 
knowledge that no poisoning of their minds has occurred.
This is good news and it is the Commission’s fervent hope that 
it will be shouted from the roof-tops.8
The Commissioner’s hopes that this would be the end of the matter were 
short-lived. Many veterans—and other observers—were concerned with 
certain aspects of the Commission, even if they did not necessarily 
dispute the overall tenor of the findings. The W AA  was angry with the 
Commission. They had urged that it be formed, and had been confident 
that the findings would confirm their worst fears. Instead, they found
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themselves In the position of being the prosecutors, with the onus of proof 
lying on them to show three things and thus prove Agent Orange guilty.
They needed to show: first, that there were in fact health 
problems; second, that those suffering from these problems had been 
exposed in some way to herbicides; and third, that it was this exposure 
which had caused the individual’s problems. The Commission found 
that while the first, the existence of health problems, had been 
demonstrated, it denied both sufficient exposure to and connection 
between herbicides and ill-health. Rather it attributed health problems 
to widespread Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and to increased 
alcohol and cigarette use, and it hinted at a possible carcinogenic effect 
of the anti-malarial drug Daosone: "Any Vietnam veteran suffering from 
cancer who may have taken daosone should have his claim treated as 
showing that a reasonable hypothesis exists connecting his incapacity 
with his war service.”9
It did allow also that some cancers could be attributed to 
chemical exposure, with the following cautious statement:
(The Commission) regards the suggestion of Soft Tissue Sarcoma 
and Lymphoma (non-Hodgkins) induction by exposure loTCDD 
in 2,4,5-T (in Agent Orange) as unlikely but not fanciful. A 
Determining Authority might well be reasonably satisfied that a 
reasonable hypothesis linking incapacity following such 
inductions with service in Vietnam exists.10
The W A A ’s case was weak in many respects, and certainly not 
equal to the task of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the chemicals 
were guilty. This is at present an impossible task, given that scientists 
themselves are in dispute. And it is not to say that the chemicals were 
guilty, nor that the chemicals are innocent—because this is not proven 
either—but merely that an open finding would have been the more 
correct one. The Commissioner has continued to defend his approach, 
emphasising that his findings have enabled many veterans to think 
positive and “get on with their lives”, free from concerns about their 
future health and that of their children.
The failure of the W A A 's  case reinforced their view that they 
could never be allowed to succeed because of the social, economic and 
political ramifications of any findings against widely-used chemicals. 
We can question why some veterans seem to be intent on proving the 
guilt of Agent Orange almost to the point of obsession, when the 
Commission’s findings mean that most claims will be allowed by the 
repatriation system on grounds other than the toxicity of chemicals. The 
answer would seem to be that being able to blame a chemical, or some 
specific agent rather than "just the war” is important to their self-esteem, 
and the diagnosis of PTSD seems to bear with it a stigma of personal 
inadequacy.
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Reports in the Australian press in March-May of 1990 claim that 
recent events in the US have given “fresh hope” to veterans in Australia. 
This refers both to the 1987 judgement in Illinois which awarded 
damages against Monsanto, and cast doubt on one of the pro-Agent 
Orange experts, Dr. Suskind, and also to favourable reports prepared by 
the Independent Agent Orange Task Force which link Agent Orange to 
various cancers and other diseases. Justice Evatt for his part is 
described as being “firm on Agent Orange”,11 even though the press seem 
to consider that the Commission’s findings have been thrown into doubt. 
Similarly, a case heard on appeal in the Repatriation System in 1990 was 
hailed by the W A A  as a “landmark” because it awarded a widow’s 
pension on the basis that a soft-tissue sarcoma (schwannoma) could 
reasonably be linked to chemical exposure in Vietnam.12 As workers in 
the area are quick to point out, however, this is only one case which may 
itself be appealed to a higher level; and soft-tissue sarcomas (a very rare 
form of cancer) were mentioned by the Royal Commission as being a 
reasonable claim anyway.
Even findings which do not provide overall support for the 
W A A ’s case are reported in a misleading way, for example, in the 
treatment o f reports by the CDC claiming that US troops who served in 
Vietnam have not developed physical problems different from those of 
veterans who served elsewhere in the world at the same time, except that 
they were at increased risk of non-Hodgkins lymphoma. Under the 
heading “Compo [compensation] hopes for Vietnam veterans”, an article 
in the Sydney Morning Herald opens by claiming that:
Compensation amounting to millions of dollars could flow to a 
number of Vietnam veterans and widows of veterans following 
publication in America of findings into the effects of exposure lo 
the defoliant Agent Orange.13
Like many of the arguments about Vietnam, the Agent Orange 
controversy was initiated in the US but then prosecuted with considerable 
vigour and sincerity by the veterans who formed the W A A , and yet even 
ten years later we still await a definitive answer. The Commission may 
have achieved its objective of reassuring veterans about their health, at 
least partially, but there is no guarantee that this will be an enduring 
achievement. The final verdict on Agent Orange is still to come.
The Health o f Veterans I—Physical Health
The Agent Orange campaign was based on the assumption that 
veterans of the Vietnam war, and their children, suffered ill-health as a 
result of exposure to chemicals during their Vietnam service. But as the 
Royal Commission concluded, there is, so far, no evidence of large-scale 
health problems among Vietnam veterans. One can conclude from this, 
optimistically, as did the Royal Commission that there are, in fact, no 
special health problems; or, one can leave it as an open question.
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Large numbers o f veterans have taken advantage o f the 
Repatriation system of pensions for disabilities. But most o f these are, 
so far, for minor disabilities and the amount o f pension involved is very 
small (see Table 1). As the veterans age, however, one would expect them 
to move to higher pension levels.
The W A A  and other believers in the chemical issue have supplied 
anecdotal evidence of both physical and mental ill-heallh among veterans, 
and o f a high incidence of birth abnormalities among their children 
conceived after service in Vietnam. The sorts of symptoms which have 
been reported by those believing they have suffered from chemical 
damage cover a wide range. The W A A  published what they called an 
“Agent Orange Questionnaire o f possible allergic symptoms" in their 
journal Debrief o f October 1982, providing a ready made check-list o f 
symptoms. Without attributing specific agency it seems more than 
coincidental that following the publication of this list there was an 
increase in the number of patients presenting to the Repatriation 
Hospitals with just these symptoms. Every system in the body was 
represented in the list, under headings of skin, ENT, eyes, respiratory, 
cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, gastro-urinary, muscular, and nervous 
system. The list is so comprehensive it covers almost every “symptom" 
that any person, sick or well, could possibly exhibit.
None of these claims about widespread and unusual ill-health 
has been substantiated in any large-scale studies.
Table 1
Rated o f D isability Pensions fo r Vietnam Veterans at June 1989





2564 10 30 7.46
1762 15-20 51 14.92
1075 25-30 64 22.38
803 35-40 73 29.84
574 45-50 80 37.30
498 60 86 44.76
281 65-70 89 52.22
333 75-80 93 59.68
122 85-90 95 67.14
448 100 100 74.60
8460
36 intermediate rate 136.25 
678 TPI (totally & permanently) 197.90
9174
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Nevertheless the W A A  persuaded the Government to undertake 
a series o f studies of veterans’ health, and as a result the Australian 
Veterans Health Studies (AVHS) group was set up. It carried out the Case 
Control Study o f Congenital Anomalies and Vietnam Service'4 (popularly 
known as the “Birth Defects Study”), completed in 1983, which found 
that “there is no evidence that Army service in Vietnam relates to the risk 
of fathering a child with an anomaly". No subsequent research has 
invalidated this conclusion, and as the Royal Commission observed, the 
sad fact is that a normal incidence o f birth defects among the children 
o f Vietnam veterans would lead us to expect between three per cent and 
ten per cent o f them to suffer some malformation.
One study undertaken since the Royal Commission has claimed 
to show a high incidence of various birth defects, as well as of marital 
instability. However, the sample used was very unrepresentative o f the 
Army, selecting atypical patterns o f engagement (whether regular or 
conscript) and rank; additionally each respondent was asked to choose 
his own control. The figures on marital breakdown in fact showed a lower 
than expected rate. Overall the results of the study are at best qualitative 
rather than quantitative.15
The second study carried out by the AVHS was a pilot morbidity 
study, designed to be the precursor to a major study of the health of 
veterans. The pilot study showed, basically that there was no discernible 
pattern o f ill-health among veterans. In spite o f the Royal Commission’s 
strong support for its implementation, the Government refused to give 
funding for the larger project, and it was finally abandoned.
The third study was, however, completed. Known as The 
Mortality Report,'6 it compared the death-rates of veteran and non­
veteran National Servicemen until 1982. The report is a mine of 
information on the career of the conscript, on both the selection 
processes which carried him to Vietnam and the structure and function 
of units in Vietnam. The overall conclusions on mortality (as opposed to 
morbidity, i.e. ill-health) were: first, that veterans ofVietnam had slightly 
higher death rates than did non-veterans, mainly because o f increased 
alcohol-related sickness; but that both groups o f National Servicemen 
had lower mortality rates than civilians o f the same age group. This was 
not a new finding. American studies had demonstrated that both Second 
World W ar and Korean veterans exhibited the “Healthy Soldier Syndrome”. 
Given the very good health and fitness o f the National Servicemen who 
were selected into the Army, and the more marked fitness o f those who 
were sent to Vietnam, we would expect them to be healthier than the 
average citizen years later, and therefore to have lower mortality rates— 
unless o f course their service in Vietnam had caused some widespread 
deterioration in their health. The study did not conclude that Vietnam 
service had produced no effects on the health of soldiers. But it did 
conclude that these effects seemed to be related to easy access to, and 
increased consumption of, those two widely used and harmful drugs of
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addiction, nicotine and alcohol. Beer was cheap, available and by far the 
most common relaxant among Australian forces in Vietnam; cigarettes 
were supplied in both army ration packs and in RSL and Red Cross 
“comfort parcels” . These two drugs have been accepted by the Repatriation 
system as being implicated in many pensionable disabilities now suffered 
by veterans o f all wars.
The Health o f Veterans II— Mental Health
As with physical health, there has been almost no research in 
Australia on the mental health o f veterans, though there have been 
studies- o f veterans undergoing psychiatric treatment. The Royal 
Commission seemed to find it acceptable to use figures from the USA to 
estimate the probable levels of stress-induced mental ill-health 
(summarised as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, known earlier as 
Vietnam Veterans Syndrome). Yet, one could argue against this on the 
grounds that both the war and the home front were different for 
Australian soldiers compared to the US forces. According to evidence 
accepted by the Royal Commission: 23.5 per cent of veterans would be 
expected to be complaining of symptoms (mostly of anxiety and 
depression); 12.2 percent would have sufficient symptoms to warrant a 
diagnosis; 5.9 per cent would have chronic conditions; and 3.2 per cent 
would be incapacitated. Most o f these men would, however, be suffering 
from these symptoms even without having had Vietnam service, as the 
base male population percentages were respectively 20 percent, 9.9 per 
cent, 4.9 per cent, and 2.4 per cent. (These figures given by the Royal 
Commission are based on a mental health survey carried out on a 
random sample o f adults in a suburb of Sydney—which perhaps would 
not be completely representative of the general population.)
The Commissioner concluded:
There is a Vietnam veterans' syndrome, broadly corresponding 
to PTSD. At this time about 25% of Vietnam veterans will have 
psychological symptoms requiring treatment, and this number 
may be expected to peak in 1988-89 and then gradually but 
steadily decline.17
These figures are in line with the Vietnam Veterans’ Counselling Service 
(W C S ) estimates that perhaps 20 per cent of all veterans are in need of 
some form o f counselling. The confusion over the possible levels of 
mental ill-health among veterans is understandable. First, measures of 
mental health in the general population are not noted for their reliability. 
There is little agreement on how to define menial health or how to 
measure it. Lay people, for instance, would probably be rather sceptical 
about the figures cited above showing 20 per cent of the male population 
to be suffering from “symptoms”; but we should remember that only a 
much smaller number seek treatment, or find these symptoms disabling. 
Second, most o f the studies specifically on veterans’ mental ill-health are
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qualitative rather than quantitative. Certainly veterans may show high 
levels of rage and violence, of guilt and distress because of combat 
experiences, but this is only evident among the population of those 
seeking counselling, or of those who are already psychiatric in-patients. 
These studies do not tell us anything about the other veterans, those who 
have not sought help. It is assumed that they, like most people, are more 
or less adjusted: or more or less maladjusted, depending on whether one 
sees the glass as half-full or half-empty.
All groups if examined would present patterns of physical and 
mental illness; the question is: do Vietnam veterans have a unique 
pattern which would lead us to believe that the problems were caused by 
their war service?To disentangle this, we need well-constructed, relatively 
large-scale research with adequate controls. Australia has been backward 
in funding research o f this type, compared at least to the United States, 
and there is currently very little data on which to make judgements.
This has not inhibited organisations such as the W A A , but it is 
hard to see them making headway against the findings of the Royal 
Commission unless some new and high quality research appears which 
incontrovertibly relates chemicals and veterans’ ill health to their 
experiences as soldiers in Vietnam. A  research group at Sydney 
University has begun a survey study of veterans' physical and mental 
health using a large sample and control group, but the results of this will 
not be known for some time, and the ultimate answers to questions about 
the health and mortality of Vietnam veterans lie somewhere in the future.
Veterans' Services— the Repat system 18
The Repatriation system was established in Australia during the 
First World War. In fact the commonly used term “Repat” is misleading, 
as the series o f legislative acts are more concerned with social security 
than with the return of soldiers to their home country. “Repat” includes 
disability and service pensions, health services, home loans, workforce 
retraining, etc. The system has undergone changes over the years, and 
was most recently revamped in 1986 when the various acts were 
consolidated into the Veterans Entitlement Act. The system is 
administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). At times the 
DVA has been accused of being unsympathetic and obstructionist 
towards veterans, which is not surprising given that the Department and 
veterans are frequently in an adversarial situation, with the veterans 
trying to show cause for the Department to release funds, and the 
Department guarding the public monies against what it sees as unfounded 
claims.
The DVA has been particularly criticised by the W A A  for 
allegedly having a bad attitude towards Vietnam veterans. The W A A  
sees the Department as being somewhat like the RSL—dominated by an 
older generation who regard veterans of the two World Wars as being the 
real returned servicemen, and who see the younger Vietnam veterans as
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having suffered insufficiently in their “conflict” to merit the fu 11 generosity 
o f “the repat”.
For some veterans, their contact with the repat system is the 
most salient aspect o f being a veteran. Unfortunately the system is a 
legalistic maze, with determination of the veteran’s eligibility and 
entitlements sometimes taking years o f com pleting applications, 
assessments, and enduring appeals. To qualify for a disability pension 
applicants or their dependants need to show that injury, or disease, or 
death has been, in general terms, “war caused”. The exact definition of 
what “war caused” means has been subject to change in recent years. 
Once entitlement to a disability pension has been accepted, the degree 
of incapacity is then assessed as being somewhere between a minimum 
10 per cent and 100 per cent, and a compensatory pension is paid 
accordingly. A  large number o f Vietnam veterans— more than 10,000—  
receive some disability pensions; most of them only receive a small 
amount, indicating that their disability has been assessed, at least for 
the present, as being only minor (See Table 1).
For an individual, having his disability accepted as being war- 
caused is not a final step. The level o f pension can be varied over his 
lifetime and the determining process is very far from static, even when 
the legislation remains the same. This is because of the system o f appeals 
through which the veteran and the DVA can proceed before a final 
judgement is given.
The Determining Process
The veteran must first approach the Repatriation Commission 
with a claim, and may be immediately successful in having it recognised 
at an acceptable level. I f not, he can then appeal, sequentially, to the 
Veterans’ Review Board, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the 
Federal Court, and, finally, the High Court. Sometimes the success or 
otherwise o f the veteran’s claim will depend on who is sitting on a Board 
on a particular day. Changes of interpretation make their way slowly 
through the whole system, and can have an impact eventually on a large 
number of claimants. Legal and medical fashions also change. What is 
considered one year to be a reasonable claim can be disallowed the next; 
what the veteran has to do is present a case which, in the light of current 
medical and legal opinion, is based on a “reasonable hypothesis” . Prior 
to legislative changes in 1985, the DVA had to disprove the veteran’s 
hypothesis that his disability was war-caused, and so almost all 
veterans’ claims were successful: but since a Federal Court ruling of 
1987 argued that veterans must present a “reasonable hypothesis” , the 
veterans now need to make stronger cases. In the words of the Court:
To be reasonable, a hypothesis must possess some degree of 
acceptability or credibility—it must not be obviously fanciful, 
impossible, incredible or not tenable or too remote or too
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tenuous... At the same time, however, a hypothesis may be
reasonable without having been proved . . .  to be correct as a
matter of fact.19
This need not be the end of the story, for in a typical contested case the 
experts from both sides can produce what to them are “plausible 
hypotheses” on which the determining authority must rule. Some 
hypotheses are rejected as not being reasonable and others are accepted, 
even though they may be dealing with contending arguments in an area 
which is far from being scientifically or medically settled.
That this need for a “plausible hypothesis” is relevant to Agent 
Orange claims is obvious; but the actual rulings have been somewhat 
unexpected. In practice the repat system has followed the findings o f the 
Evatt Royal Commission and disallows claims based on exposure to 
defoliants and insecticides, thus ruling that there are no plausible 
hypotheses relating any disabilities to chemical exposure. The W A A , 
understandably, continues to fight against this ruling, and there are 
several cases currently in the process o f being heard. The other side of 
the coin, however, is that by following the Royal Commission findings 
almost all claims based on stress as the war-caused catalyst o f disabilities 
will be allowed, as will those in which smoking and / or alcohol consumption 
are implicated and where these behaviours are found to be caused or 
aggravated by war service (as generally seems to be the case).
In spite o f the seeming comprehensiveness of the repat benefits, 
the Vietnam veteran community has continued to lobby for special 
services. The W A A  achieved a significant victory in 1982 with the 
establishment o f the Vietnam Veterans Counselling Service (W C S ). 
Modelled on its US counterpart, the service provides a 24 hour, shop­
front counselling network for veterans and their families. It has records 
on over 5000 clients, and reports over 23,000 contacts per year. 
Counsellors estimate that the 10 per cent o f all Vietnam veterans that 
they have seen to date represents perhaps half the total number who are 
in need o f some counselling. Some o f those who contact the W C S  have 
only m inor problems, but a large number have been diagnosed as having 
PTSD. The service seems to have fulfilled a need, and has the support o f 
all veteran groups, although some would like to see the service broadened 
to include veterans o f all wars. The W C S  is very much a child o f its 
times. It epitomises the anti-psychiatry, non-drug therapeutic fashions 
o f the 1980s; and its success confirms the limits o f the highly 
bureaucratised, establishment medical care which is provided through 
the repat system.
Speaking for the Veterans 20
After the final, low-key withdrawal o f Australian combat troops 
from Vietnam, the whole episode was publicly forgotten. The men who 
had fought and returned, and the bereaved families of those who had not
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returned, were left to sort out things as best they could. At that time— 
in the early 1970s— there was no particular concept of “the Vietnam 
veteran” in Australia. In a newspaper report on the 1970 Anzac Day 
march, the word “veteran” was still presented in quotation marks. It was 
only in the following years, as the issue of veterans and especially Agent 
Orange came to the fore, that this Americanism was widely adopted 
along with many other concepts and u sages from our trans-Pacific allies.
In the early years after the war, there seems to have been no 
feeling that the soldiers returned from Vietnam constituted a special 
case. They were eligible to join the RSL, the “natural” spokesman for all 
returned servicemen; the repatriation system was in place; there was 
little unemployment; they were fit young men who had only done twelve 
month’s active service in what was a minor conflict anyway.
To trace the reasons why other groups besides the RSL, 
especially the W A A , came into being in the late 1970s, it is necessary 
to consider: first, the nature o f the RSL; and secondly, the impact o f the 
Agent Orange issue.
When the large numbers of Australian servicemen returned from 
overseas at the end of the First World War, there was competition as to 
who would legitimately speak for these “returned men”. The winner was 
the RSL (the initials o f its abbreviated title o f Relum ed Servicemen’s 
League— now de-”sexed”, as it were, to Returned Service’s League), an 
organisation which has flourished and enjoys direct government access 
at the highest levels. The RSL has unfortunately strayed beyond its brief 
to promote the welfare of ex-service personnel, and its various state 
organisations are vocal in support o f familiar conservative causes, such 
as the preservation of our current national flag, o f white Anglo-Celtic 
dominance in our culture and racial mix, and of the traditional role of 
women.
The RSL is only one among many veterans groups, but is by far 
the largest and most visible. Nevertheless it does not enjoy universal 
acceptance among the veteran community. Even at its height in the 
1920s, the League’s membership has been around 265,000, or some 30 
per cent of those eligible to join. The RSL claims that Vietnam veterans 
are joining at the same rate as veterans of previous wars, and that 
around 15,000 are currently members.
Each generation has fought its own war, at roughly 20 year 
intervals. Each generation has found some problem with acceptance by 
their elders, and no later soldiers in Australia have attained the status 
of those who returned from the First World War, and particularly those 
who landed at Anzac Cove in 1915 and served on the Gallipoli Peninsula. 
Each group will eventually have its turn as leaders of the veteran 
community, as the old soldiers die, but those of the Vietnam generation 
have particular problems in taking their place.
V eiy  large numbers of Australians, all o f them volunteers, served 
overseas in the First World War and then founded the RSL. Even greater
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numbers served in the armed forces in the Second W orld W ar (over 
660,000). Small contingents went to Korea, Malaya and Borneo. Just 
over 50,000 served in Vietnam, over half o f them volunteers but with a 
significant number o f conscripts. The Vietnam generation of soldiers was 
thus a comparatively small group, going to a war which was not 
universally popular, many of them conscripted (though not necessarily 
very reluctant), and, perhaps most significantly, they did not come home 
as victors. They did not all find it easy to see themselves as true heirs 
o f the Anzacs, nor did they find it easy to move into the RSL.
The issue which brought their relationship with the RSL to a head, 
however, was that o f Agent Orange.
The Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia (originally the 
Vietnam Veterans’ Action Association) had its beginnings in the concern 
o f veterans that their health and welfare needs were not being met by the 
DVA and that the RSL was ignoring their plight. The W A A  were 
operating on two levels: they implemented a program ofcrisis counselling 
and intervention, the forerunner to the W C S ; and they lobbied hard and 
publicly for the investigation o f their claims that Australian soldiers in 
Vietnam had been exposed to a variety of chemicals, and that this 
exposure had caused widespread health problems. The RSL did not share 
the W A A 's  concerns. Its attitude, overall, has been that “all veterans 
have a few problems, the blokes who’ve been to Vietnam didn’t have as 
tough a time anyway”; and that, “the established channels can handle 
it anyway”. These attitudes, as well as some personality clashes, led to 
bitter relations between the RSL and the W A A .
The W A A  accused the RSL o f “betraying” the Vietnam veterans 
by siding with the DVA and apologists in the government who initially 
denied that Australian troops had been exposed at all to any chemicals 
(this initial foolish statement was soon retracted). “Betrayal” is o f course 
a key m otif in the whole Vietnam picture:21 the troops were betrayed by 
the politicians; they were betrayed by protesters in the streets; by 
unionists; and by the Saigon regime who white-anted their best efforts, 
and then lost the war. Some Australians even see the Americans as 
having betrayed them by making a half-hearted attempt at victory. This 
pattern o f betrayal continues a well known theme in Australian military 
history in which Australia is depicted as a jun ior ally, better at war than 
the senior partner, but doomed to fail overall because of the senior 
partner’s faintheartedness or stupidity.
The W A A  in its early years thus continued the story of Vietnam. 
There was a deep and keenly felt cynicism directed against all authority 
figures and politicians, both those who sent the troops to Vietnam and 
those who opposed participation in the conflict; and for many veterans 
there was hostility to anyone who had not shared their experiences, 
especially those connected with the anti-war movement or who did not 
share their views about the problems of veterans. This sense o f isolation, 
almost o f paranoia, seems to be one of the factors which kept the
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voluntary leadership o f the W A A  organisation so motivated. The other 
more positive factor is a very strong and sincere desire to help other 
veterans.
The W A A  does not represent all veterans, any more than does 
the RSL. A  variety of veterans groups meets a variety of needs both for 
veterans in general and those of Vietnam in particular. As well as the 
unit associations, there are welfare groups self-styled as “non-political” 
in order to contrast themselves with the W A A . Indeed some veterans 
actively dislike the W A A . It is seen as “political” , as being in conflict with 
authority, whereas many veterans want a harmonious integration into 
the dominant RSL/Anzac Day culture. Some resent the W A A ’s portrayal 
o f the veteran as sick or needy with children damaged by chemicals. For 
many veterans, their identity is not dominated by their war service, and 
if they jo in  any veterans group they do so for some comradeship and 
community activity rather than as a total commitment.
Like most self-help groups, the W A A  suffers from chronic 
shortages of funds and experienced and willing personnel, particularly 
for mounting and sustaining legal action. Nevertheless, it has been quite 
successful in recruiting and maintaining membership (it claimed around 
15,000 at its peak, though 5,000 seems typical), and most active in 
providing help to veterans when they need it most. Without the W A A , 
particularly without the energy and dedication of its leaders such as Phil 
Thompson, it seems very unlikely that either the W C S  or the Royal 
Commission would have been established.
The future of Vietnam Veteran groups
The Royal Commission has been and gone, although some 
groups are still fighting its findings. The long-term future of the Agent 
Orange dispute is unclear, and this dispute has been for long the driving 
force behind the main separate Vietnam veterans action group, the 
W A A . If Agent Orange ceases for whatever reason to be an issue— either 
because chemically-induced damage is accepted as a cause of disability, 
or because this is finally ruled out—then it is hard to see what special 
role there will be for Vietnam veterans groups. It appears that membership 
in the W A A  declined considerably after the Royal Commission ended, 
and after the resolution o f many outstanding issues by the success o f the 
Welcome Home March in October 1987.
It is likely, it seems, that there will be a gradual merging of the 
various groups, particularly as the W A A  mellows. Many veterans are 
members of more than one group, and in future years the relatively 
young Vietnam veterans will in all likelihood take over the RSL. Whether 
they then change its nature, or become in their turn integrated into its 
conservative political culture, will no doubt be a point of contention.
Some institutional pressures are already forcing the organisations 
to work more closely together. For instance, the Vietnam War Veterans 
Trust, which was set up to disburse the money received from the class
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action against Agent Orange in the USA, has representatives from the 
RSL, from the W A A , and from other veterans groups.
So too with the committee to establish a special Australian 
Vietnam Forces National Memorial. The W A A  has been the most active 
supporter of this project, and is raising much of the funds, but the 
Australian Government has also donated some $200,000 and the 
committee to choose the monument’s design (from entries in a competition) 
has a wide range o f membership.22
The W A A ’s immediate future probably lies in providing 
personalised counsel and support to veterans and their families. In this 
it will be almost an arm of the W C S , and may even become redundant, 
being more like the camaraderie groups such as the RSL and the 
Vietnam Legion of Veterans.
In assessing the effectiveness o f the W A A  as an organisation, the 
most striking thing has been its success at defining the image o f “the 
veteran” through the media. From the time o f its formation in 1980, the 
W A A  depicted the experience of returning from the war as an 
overwhelmingly negative one. During the 1980s, almost the only 
discussions o f Vietnam in the media were in terms of “the veteran and 
his problems", problems which have been seen as caused by either 
exposure to toxic chemicals and/or the unpopularity o f the war. The 
images of the war which linger in the public mind— insofar as they do 
linger at all— are probably drawn more from American than Australian 
experiences. The popular culture of the US— its movies, pop music, and 
television—have been as important in depicting the nature of the war 
and o f the veteran experience as USA political leaders were in defining 
the nature of the Vietnam “problem” years earlier.
Welcome Home 23
The return home of the Vietnam veteran has been portrayed in 
many American films and literary works. The indifference o f the method 
has been universally condemned as an insensitive and alienating 
approach to the repatriation of a soldier fresh from combat or at least 
from service in a war zone: take him from his unit; load him on a plane: 
land him somewhere in the US; and then send him home; once there he 
is given no parades; no ceremonies; and no peer support during his 
readjustment period, which may be relatively short (particularly if he 
remains in the service), or may be a never-ending process.
This picture has been accepted completely as portraying the 
Australian experience also, but this was not the case for a large number 
of servicemen. True. Australian soldiers were sometimes, even often, 
dumped at an airport in the middle of the night and left to make their own 
way home, but others were treated like war heroes at least briefly. 
Whether or not this brief welcome home ceremony was sufficient either 
as comfort, reward, or merely served as a gesture of transition, is indeed 
arguable, but it is important that the veterans’ experiences are recorded
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accurately before we can begin to argue about what would be desirable 
treatment. One hopes that the Vietnam experiences in both the US and 
Australia would lead to the services adopting as routine the practices of 
extensive debriefing and group support after any active duty, but neither 
set o f institutions has shown in the past that they are prone to learn 
expeditiously from soldiers’ experiences.
The Australian army prided itself on the morale and group 
cohesion of its units,2,1 and the infantry units were rotated on a unit basis 
rather than individually. They served for 12 months in Vietnam, but 
before this had sometimes gone through months or even years of training 
as a unit. Since all individual soldiers normally served 12 months in 
Vietnam also, this would mean—in theory—that all soldiers went to 
Vietnam together in their unit and returned with it 12 months later. 
Unfortunately this did not work out quite so well in practice, and 
generalising statements that Australian personnel rotation was on a unit 
basis need to be treated with some caution. The mainmodification to the 
group rotation theory came about through the operation of National 
Service (as the draft was called in Australia). Those who were “called up” 
were obliged to serve in the army for two years (later reduced to 18 
months), and were inducted into the army in four intakes per year, at 
three month intervals. When their two years service was completed, of 
course, they were discharged from the army and had no more immediate 
obligations.
Because the intakes were staggered, so too were the discharges, 
and some soldiers served only a few months in Vietnam before they 
returned to Australia. These “nashos” , as they were known, accounted 
for most o f the turnover in the units, but there were also the unavoidable 
departures occasioned by death, injury, disease, or on compassionate 
grounds. So , in practice, significant numbers of soldiers even from 
combat units did not return home with their units. Many, however, seem 
to have returned in groups, o f varying small sizes, with others who had ' 
undergone basic training at the same time, and those who trained 
together always forged strong bonds. (The small size of the Australian 
army meant that there were only three recruit training battalions, and 
drafts who had completed their basic training tended to go to the same 
units.) Other soldiers, from combat and non-combat units alike, returned 
home as they had arrived in Vietnam: more or less alone. It is not possible 
to say exactly how many were in each of these categories.
Some soldiers returned quickly, lifted out of their unit and then 
onto a charter flight, while some came as medevacs in Air Force Hercules. 
Arguably, the lucky ones took the slower boat trip home, with a chance 
to begin to adjust to leaving the war zone while still with their support 
providing unit. But no matter how they returned, readjustment was a 
difficult time for almost all soldiers— as no doubt it has always been, no 
matter how heroic the return. The easiest readjustment was, no doubt, 
for the career soldiers who remained in the army community, many of
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whom would choose to return to Vietnam for a second tour. For them 
there was relatively little contact with the civilian community. There 
seems to have been little questioning within the services about Australia’s 
role in Vietnam, adding to the continuity of high morale.
Many veterans seem to have only dim memories about the return 
home, discharge from the army, and readjustment period. For those 
whose families provided a warm welcome there seems to have been 
relatively little trauma, but most veterans have tales to tell o f being 
greeted with “haven’t seen you for awhile—where’ve you been?” This 
apparent lack of knowledge, and, worse, o f interest, about where they 
had been or what they had been doing, was the most typical remembered 
reaction, although there were also cases of hostility directed at the 
returning soldiers, especially in the later years of the war.
Public opinion polls and the results of two federal elections 
showed that the Australian electorate was not, at least initially, particularly 
opposed to the war. On the contraiy, the reception given to those troops 
who did march on their return home, shows that there was abundant 
warmth and welcome in the community towards the soldiers. It is an 
interesting aspect of the collective veteran memory of Vietnam that these 
earliest “welcome home" marches seem to have been so comprehensively 
forgotten. The truth is that all of the battalions marched in capital cities 
when they returned to their home bases— sixteen marches in all— 
accompanied by other troops who had returned at or near that time. 
Most of these marches took place in Sydney and Brisbane, but there were 
some in Adelaide and Townsville (a provincial town in north Queensland 
which has an army base nearby). From the first march, in June 1966 in 
Sydney, until the last one, in December 1971 in Townsville, the troops 
were cheered and clapped by thousands—even hundred of thousands— 
of onlookers. Looking back, the remarkable thing is how little the spirit 
of public welcome for the soldiers seemed to be affected by the growing 
anti-war feeling. The final march was just before Christmas 1971, in 
Townsville:
Thousands of Townsville people turned on a rousing heroes’ 
welcome. Cheering drowned the sound of marching feet for three 
city blocks as Townsville made the most of the last major parade 
by troops from Vietnam. The marchers were swamped with 
streamers and ticker-tape thrown from balconies and roadside 
vantage points. The crowd which packed the Flinders Street 
footpaths to capacity has been described as the largest ever to 
turn out and welcome troops returning from the war zone.25
The End of the War
The parade in Townsville almost marked the end of the war for 
Australia, but significantly, it did not mean the end o f the war in general, 
nor was it an occasion for rejoicing or for the sort of victory celebrations 
that had heralded Armistice Day at the end of the First World War, or
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Victory in the Pacific Day in 1945. There was, o f course, no victoiy to 
celebrate.
Australia’s end to its commitment was aptly termed a “withdrawal". 
But some soldiers and others in the wider community retained the idea 
that Australian forces were somehow victorious in at least their own 
province o f PhuocTuy. The argument goes that Australia’s war in Phuoc 
Tuy resulted in the substantial destruction o f the Viet Cong forces there; 
that the province at the time o f the withdrawal of the Task Force was 
“secure” ; and it is added, generally, that had Australia, as a nation and 
a military presence, been sufficiently large and committed to waging war 
all over the south of Vietnam, then the final result would have been quite 
different. We, it is claimed, would have won.20
It is important to appreciate this view of the war, in order to 
understand the attitude of Vietnam veterans in Australia. Not all of 
them, by any means, make these claims to partial let alone total potential 
victory; but a significant number do, and are to be found at all levels of 
the Army and o f veterans’ organisations. Many of the more modest make 
the defensible claim that the Australian forces performed very well in 
Vietnam, and in this were true heirs of Anzac. This claim too is important 
for an understanding o f the position of Vietnam veterans. American 
forces were perceived as not only beaten, in that they abandoned the war, 
but Australian soldiers also tend to be very patronising about the combat 
performance of American soldiers; seeing them as having been “beaten" 
in many instances at the tactical level. They tend to ignore the great 
differences between the sheer scale o f their efforts and the American 
commitment, and also the extent to which they relied on the Americans 
for logistic and operational support. Nevertheless, there has been none 
of the postwar criticism of the armed forces in Australia that occurred in 
the United States, let alone any suggestion that the Australian forces in 
Vietnam “disintegrated”.
The sight of the tanks rolling into the Presidential Palace during 
the “fall” o f Saigon in 1975 dispelled the illusion of victory for some o f the 
committed; others still maintain that “we won”. But the events o f 1975 
were the climax to a war which had ground on through so many lives for 
so many years. After the ownership of the south was finally resolved, and 
the Vietnam question was buried, there began a quiet period for Vietnam 
veterans. No longer were they participants in any sort of conflict, military 
or political; theirs was very much a forgotten war, but at least for 
veterans in Australia it was not as discredited as in the USA, nor had 
their part in it been subjected to so much criticism.
The decade after Vietnam was one of considerable social change 
in Australia, and the issue of Vietnam and of its veterans was not on the 
agenda. Some o f the issues which did come to the fore, however, such as 
those involving the re-definitions of masculinity and femininity, and the 
place of multiculturalism and of non-Anglo-Celtic migrants (particularly 
those of Asian extraction) in Australia, did bear directly on the experiences
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of the veterans. Were they being made to feel that fighting against Asian 
communists, for other Asians, was somehow an important contribution? 
Was the whole Anzac myth now somehow out-of-place? (The 75th 
Anniversary o f Gallipoli in April 1990 revitalised interest in the whole 
Anzac mythology. The intense media flirtation was nothing if not in 
marked contrast to the near disdain o f the previous decade or more.)
The myth o f Anzac comes from an older Australia, a simpler and 
more homogeneous country, where masculine virtues were supreme 
and unchallenged and the British or American empires were glorious to 
be dependent upon. Anzac Day, the main ritual celebration of the myth, 
is not a place for subtleties (though it no doubt means different things 
to different people), nor for the celebration o f pluralism and differences. 
Vietnam, with all its ambiguities, does not fit easily into the sequence of 
Australian wars, for even though it was typical in being an alliance war 
with Australia participating to ensure the future protection o f a great and 
powerful friend, this time we were not on the winning side, and some 
even argued that we were not on the right side.
All that most veterans wanted was to be able to feel like the 
veterans o f previous wars, but there seems to have been a doubt that they 
were fully worthy. Some o f them were sneered at by older soldiers in RSL 
clubs— ”you blokes never had it tough like we did”— and others obviously 
had doubts themselves about whether they truly deserved to be ranked 
with the Anzacs. These doubts may, however, have been largely o f their 
own making, as the public seems to have welcomed them on Anzac 
marches and their numbers there were a welcome addition to the 
declining ranks o f the veterans of the earlier world wars. From the 
earliest years o f the war, soldiers who had returned from Vietnam took 
part in Anzac marches. In 1967, the Sydney Morning Herald reported:
. . .  in the continuing story of the Anzac tradition, soldiers who
had returned from the conflict in Vietnam marched down Martin
Place with veterans of Korea, Malaya and Borneo and members
of the 3rd and 6th Battalions RAR.27
According to the report the young onlookers were the ones leading the 
cheers amongst the 100,000 who lined the streets. In the immediately 
following years, the Sydney Morning Herald always made special 
mention o f the Vietnam veterans in Anzac marches, culminating in 1972 
when they were given the honour o f leading the march in Sydney. This 
was the high point o f their participation, as far as media reporting was 
concerned. In 1973 and 1974 they were still mentioned, but in the years 
after this the celebration of Anzac Day itself underwent change. It 
became more o f a focus for dissenting activities, and was reported as 
such in the major cities. Groups such as Women Against Rape in W ar (a 
particular favourite amongst soldiers as the butt of jokes). Gay Ex- 
Servicemen’s Associations, and ethnic communities with various and
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competing war histories and agendas of their own, began to demand the 
right to participate in the march. The RSL fought hard to retain the 
ownership o f Anzac and to disallow these minorities central participation.
During this time the Vietnam veterans were largely unheard of, 
until the Agent Orange issue was aired at an Anzac Day march in Sydney 
in 1980. About 100 veterans marched with small pieces o f orange paper 
on their jackets, but the organisers were eager to emphasise that they 
were not radicals:
• This is not a political protest. The crepe paper signifies our 
concern over the issue. We are the conservative element in 
Australia. We are members of RSL clubs. We served our country 
and we would like our country to serve us.28
This statement could well be taken as the theme of the 1987 Welcome 
Home March.
The success of the welcome home marches in the USA, particularly 
that in Washington D.C. in 1986, was contagious. A  committee was set 
up in Sydney in 1986, supported by a variety of veterans groups, the 
state branch of the RSL (not the national body), and some Sydney local 
government representatives. The power o f the Vietnam war to divide, 
still, was seen in some o f the exchanges reported as occuring in the 
chambers o f the Sydney City Council. A  veteran on the Council accused 
those opposed to the march of being part o f the “gay communist faction” , 
while a councillor who had been an anti-conscription activist countered 
that “there has never been an attempt at repatriation for those who chose 
the path which history has shown was the morally right path” .29 This idea 
was repeated frequently on an Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(ABC) TV programme. Hindsight, broadcast in May 1990, which marked 
the 20th anniversary of the anti-war Moratorium marches.
In the days preceding the march, the media was full o f contrary 
opinions about what the march, and indeed the war itself, was all about. 
While some saw it as a reconciliation and were willing to let bygones-be- 
bygones, others were keen to argue their case yet again. Conservative 
writers in the national daily newspaper, the Australian, explained why 
“It was right for us to be there” , and blamed “Left-liberal anti-South 
Vietnam, pro-Hanoi forces" who were “traitors to their own troops. They 
are the ones who should apologise to our veterans and to the Vietnamese 
who marched with them”.30 (Many Australians resented the activities of 
one university group who had collected money to send to the Viet Cong 
for medical supplies— it still rankled years later.)
The main Welcome Home March was held on the morning of 
Saturday 4 October 1987 in Sydney, followed by an afternoon and 
evening of congregation and further ceremony, including a concert. 
Other local and much sm aller m arches and celebrations were 
subsequently held all over Australia.
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Many veterans in the Sydney march took delight in ignoring the 
Labor Party Prime Minister, R.J. L. (Bob) Hawke, as he took the salute 
on the steps o f the Sydney Town Hall, because the Labor Party had 
(according to the march organiser) “so strongly opposed the forces” 
presence in Vietnam". (This in fact was not strictly true. Though the 
Labor Party did eventually propose withdrawing Australian troops, by 
the time it came to government, in December 1972, the only troops 
remaining were the advisers, the major troop withdrawals having taken 
place under a Liberal Government, but many veterans m isremember the 
sequence of events.)
The media treated the 1987 Welcome Home March in much the 
same way as they had treated the war and its veterans in the past, with 
glib and often inaccurate analysis, and using images based on the “sick 
veteran" as portrayed by the W A A  in their submissions to the Royal 
Commission and through their journal Debrief and elsewhere. The same 
image occurs throughout much Australian Vietnam literature, film, and 
television.31 Just before Anzac Day 1987 the Sydney Morning Herald 
reported that:
For Australians who served in Vietnam the stench of a “dirty war" 
has been hard to shake. They have always trailed at the end of 
Army contingents in the Anzac Day parade—as if an 
afterthought.32
A  few days later the same paper in an editorial wrongly stated: “For the 
first time, Vietnam veterans led the Anzac Day march in Sydney" (as we 
have seen, they led it in 1972). The same editorial emphasised the 
potential o f the Welcome Home March as a ritual signifying the 
reintegration of veterans into the community; but it warned against 
believing that the parade was in itself enough. It needed to mark a new 
beginning, to be a sign that we had all “begun to gain a sense of historical 
perspective on the profound conflicts which the Vietnam W ar aroused".33
W hether this in fact has happened is debatable, but the march 
was a great success for the veterans involved, probably almost half o f 
those who had served in Vietnam (the march was estimated at 22,000), 
including veterans o f the ARVN marching under the old Saigon flag. The 
brilliant spring weather saw huge, friendly crowds lining the streets, 
cheering the veterans and leaving little doubt as to whether they were 
welcome home or not. There were none o f the feared “incidents" from 
former anti-war groups, and most of the signs and crowd comments (not 
to mention the commentary on the nationally-broadcast televised version 
of (he event34) were distinctly “pro-war”. The reunions will provide warm 
memories for years to come, and it seems that the march did provide 
some sort o f finale to the war for many of the veterans.
But as with every facet o f the Vietnam war, there was not 
complete consensus about the march. Outsiders viewed it from various
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perspectives, som e seeing the com m unity acceptance o f the veterans as 
being p roof that “it was right for us to be there” . Even w ith in  the veteran 
community, there were those who ignored it, as being irrelevant to their 
present lives, and there were those who saw it as little m ore than “a 
recruiting drive for the RSL” .
Th is w as very much a m inority criticism  o f the march, but it does 
raise the very im portant question o f how far integration o f the war and 
veterans results in their incorporation into a national m yth which is 
rather m ilitaristic. M ichael C lark has described this process in the 
United States, saying that the cu ltural apparatus which had so 
successfully channelled the m em ories o f the V ietnam  w ar to fit the 
patterns o f other, m ore acceptable w ar experiences, has finally offered 
“with a trium phant flourish . . . the spectacle o f its m ost successful 
creation, the veteran who will fight the next war.35
Is this what “being an Anzac” really m eans? Is this what the 
veterans would want? Is it the price o f acceptance?
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